The Institutional Risk Analyst

The SVB duration management from 2020 onward was recklessly negligent by any reasonable standard

Selling the Treasury's control position in the GSEs while dragging the furious shareholders along behind is not an attractive opportunity

NYCB and the unsold rent-stabilized assets left over from the failure of SBNY are two little surprises waiting for the next POTUS.

Last year, when a lot of people were predicting the demise of SCHW, we told our readers to calm down.

We all dodged a bullet in Q2 2023 because the repricing of assets and deposits slowed from the crazy levels seen at the end of March.

If we assume that asset returns will continue to rise, but that bank funding costs will rise 5x asset returns, then US banks have a problem

We liked the NYCB + Flagstar story prior to the transaction with the FDIC for the assets and deposits of Signature Bank.

Rapidly rising interest rates in Q3 2022 pushed down the tangible capital for the US banking industry to negative $1.9 trillion

Will the market risk created by quantitative tightening (QT) tip over a large bank or nonbank financial firm?